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INTRODUCTION 
Creative defendants regularly employ tactics compelling plaintiffs to 
reevaluate or abandon their litigation position. For example, if the defendant 
discovers that the plaintiff has failed to meet a third-party compliance 
obligation, the defendant may report, or threaten to report, the failure in order 
to coerce the plaintiff.1 Some evidence suggests that hospital management 
organizations have used this tactic to compel settlements from competitors 
committing antitrust violations.2 In some instances, the enforcing third party 
may be a private, rather than a government, actor.3 Regardless of the 
enforcing party’s specific character, so long as the violation’s disclosure will 
 
 1. Though such threats may be susceptible to actions for extortion as discussed in greater detail 
herein.  
 2. See, e.g., Nina Youngstrom, Hospitals Have Options to Level the Playing Field with 
Noncompliant Competitors, AISHEALTH (October 26, 2015), https://aishealth.com/archive/rmc102615-
01 (reprinted from REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, Volume 24 Issue 38) 
Given the stakes, health care organizations may want to take matters into their own hands, lawyers say . . . We see 
health care organizations trying very hard and devoting significant resources to compliance efforts, but if their 
competitors are not following suit, that becomes a real problem . . . there are a number of ways to go about it. They 
include reporting a competitor’s misconduct to its own hotline, using the private right of action under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and tipping off the government. . . . The antitrust laws are 
another avenue for challenging conduct that health care organizations believe is illegal . . . . 
Particularly, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) permits a civil action for injury following violation of § 1962 regarding 
racketeering activity. As another example application, consider, e.g., Corcel Corp. v. Ferguson 
Enterprises, Inc., 551 F. App’x 571 (11th Cir. 2014) wherein a plumber subjected their competition to a 
RICO suit. Contrast, e.g., Stenehjem v. Sareen 226 Cal. App. 4th 1405 (6th Dist. 2014) (finding 
extortion). Compare the posture of these cases with subsequent footnotes in this Article regarding the use 
of a third party beneficiary claim to obviate extortion arguments. While the “influence” diagrams are very 
similar, the mechanism necessary to pose the threat without implicating extortion may differ greatly.  
 3. For example, where the compliance breach implicates a contractual obligation for a third party 
(as is the case with regard to some open source licenses, such as the GPL, which includes a source code 
copyleft obligation, unlike the MIT and BSD licenses, which do not), the third party may be the enforcing 
interest. Additionally, the defendant may itself be the enforcing interest in some instances such as in a 
qui tam action (as in the case of certain actions under the False Claims Act). Similarly, though the tactics 
discussed in this Article refer to open source specifically, much of the same reasoning and logic applies 
mutatis mutandis to third party patent infringement actions.  
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precipitate action against the plaintiff, the knowledge of the violation may 
provide the defendant with leverage to effect a favorable settlement.4 
Open source software presents an emerging and compelling vehicle for 
these compliance-based defense tactics.5 It is not entirely clear whether the 
defendants employed these tactics in the recent XimpleWare v. Versata 
collection of cases (See Section I.A below, hereinafter collectively referred 
to as XimpleWare), but the XimpleWare fact pattern illustrates the potential 
effectiveness and limitations of such tactics. While news and legal 
commentators have previously discussed XimpleWare6, to the Author’s 
knowledge, XimpleWare has not yet received a game-theory analysis 
thoroughly exploring its rich potential as a compliance-based defensive 
tactic. Particularly, XimpleWare exemplifies an open source topology 
affording unique strategic opportunities unavailable to many other 
compliance-based tactics.7 Accordingly, this Article abstracts from the 
XimpleWare topology to determine when and to what extent a defendant may 
employ such tactics to enhance their bargaining position (Section II). This 
Article then examines countermeasures a plaintiff may employ to mitigate 
such tactics’ effectiveness (Section III). 
 
 4. Indeed, the threat of enforcement may even suffice to obviate the business dynamic which 
precipitated the plaintiff’s action. For example, consider where a plaintiff sues a defendant to secure 
market share for their product. The revelation that their product is non-compliant with an upstream 
agreement, however, coupled with a high cost (perhaps impossible) to remediate, may obviate the 
plaintiff’s ability to remain in the market. In the open source context, this may occur when the plaintiff 
pervasively integrated a copyleft component into a well-established product offering and the copyleft 
requirements prevent profitable licensing terms. 
 5. In addition to the benefits relative to extortion discussed herein, copyright infringement also 
proceeds under the “separate-accrual” rule, wherein the three-year statute of limitations is reset for each 
new infringing act. See, e.g., Petrella v. MGM, 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1964 (2014) (“A claim ordinarily accrues 
when an infringing act occurs. Under the separate-accrual rule that attends the copyright statute of 
limitations, when a defendant has committed successive violations, each infringing act starts a new 
limitations period. However, under § 507(b), each infringement is actionable only within three years of 
its occurrence.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Jaideep Reddy, The Consequences of Violating Open Source Licenses, BERKLEY 
TECH. L.J,: THE BOLT (November 8, 2015), http://btlj.org/2015/11/consequences-violating-open-source-
licenses/ (While recognizing that open source breaches may be costly, commentators generally stop short 
of rigorously characterizing that cost or exploring the factors affecting its viability as a negotiation tool). 
 7. In many ways, open source software presents a strategic “perfect storm” for the threat-maker. 
As discussed herein, open source asymmetrically benefits the threat-maker in that it obviates extortion 
counterarguments, permits open information gathering by the threat-maker (many companies’ software 
can be reverse-engineered or publicly reviewed), provides for “separate accrual” of copyright 
infringement actions, and favors the threat-maker in the timing with which they threaten the infringer, or 
approach the copyright-holder for purchase. Such asymmetries will likely increase the tactic’s prevalence 
in the future.  
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I. EXAMPLE PATTERN: XIMPLEWARE V. VERSATA 
A. XimpleWare Specific Litigation Topology 
XimpleWare, as used in this Article, refers to the following five cases, 
three in Texas and two in California: 
1. Texas Federal, Western District: Case No. 1:10cv792 - Versata 
Software Inc. v. Infosys; 
2. Texas State, Travis County: Case No. D-1-GN-12-003588: - 
Versata Software Inc. f/k/a Trilogy Software, Inc. and Versata 
Development Group Inc. f/k/a Trilogy Development Group Inc. v. 
Ameriprise Financial Inc., et al.; 
3. Texas Federal, Western District: Case No. 1:14-cv-12 - Versata 
Software Inc. v. Ameriprise Financial Services Inc. et al.; 
4. California Federal, Northern District: Case No. 3:13cv5160: - 
XimpleWare Corp. v. Versata Software Inc., Trilogy Development 
Group, Inc., Ameriprise Financial, Inc., Ameriprise Financial 
Services, Inc., Aurea Software, Inc.; and 
5. California Federal, Northern District: Case No. 5:13cv5161 - 
XimpleWare Corp. v. Versata Software Inc., Aurea Software Inc., 
Trilogy Development Group, Inc., Ameriprise Financial Services, 
Inc., Ameriprise Financial, Inc., United HealthCare Services, Inc., 
Waddell & Reed, Inc., Aviva USA Corporation, Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, The 
Prudential Insurance Company of America, Inc., Wellmark, Inc. 
Initially, in the Texas cases, Versata accused Ameriprise and its affiliate 
Infosys of violating the technology license agreement for Versata’s 
Distribution Channel Management (“DCM”) software.8 Particularly, Versata 
alleged that Infosys decompiled and reverse engineered the DCM’s source 
code in 2008-2009, violating several express prohibitions in the DCM 
agreement (Action #1).9 Versata alleged that Infosys then used the 
knowledge gained from the decompilation on behalf of Ameriprise (Actions 
 
 8. See, e.g., Pl’s. Third Am. Compl. at 4, Versata Software Inc. v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
(2014), (No.1:10-cv-00792-SS), 2014 WL 10321037. 
Infosys, acting through its agents and employees, improperly accessed, utilized, copied, disassembled, and 
decompiled Versata’s confidential source code in 2008 and 2009. In 2008, Infosys was providing software 
maintenance services for Ameriprise at the same time that Versata provided software services to Ameriprise. 
Infosys’ agents and employees, working on Versata’s code base at Ameriprise, decompiled Versata’s DCM source 
code and created new code for the benefit of Infosys.  
 9. Id. at 4; 9-11, “Subsections (d) and (e) are even more specific, and prohibit Infosys from 
copying, reproducing, disassembling, decompiling, or reverse engineering Versata’s confidential 
information”.  
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#2, #3).10 Consequently, Versata alleged copyright infringement, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition, among other 
causes of action.11 
During the course of this Texas litigation, however, Ameriprise 
discovered that Versata’s DCM itself did not appear to comply with the 
license terms for at least one of its upstream components.12 Particularly, 
DCM used a software component called VTD-XML, which was developed 
by the California company XimpleWare. XimpleWare released VTD-XML 
under the General Public License v2.0 (GPLv2.0), an open source license.13 
The GPLv2.0 requires, among other things, that downstream distributors of 
derivative works provide the distribution under the GPLv2.0, and that the 
distributor make available the derivative work’s source code to downstream 
recipients.14 According to court documents, upon discovering that Versata’s 
distribution of DCM did not comply with the GPL’s requirements, 
Ameriprise notified XimpleWare of the noncompliance.15 
XimpleWare subsequently initiated litigation against both Versata and 
Ameriprise in California (Actions #4 and #5) based upon the noncompliant 
distribution and use of the GPLv2.0 licensed VTD-XML (Ameriprise, as a 
non-compliant downstream user of the code was likewise alleged to have 
committed copyright infringement).16 XimpleWare also sued Versata’s 
customers (e.g., Pacific Life Insurance, Wellmark, Inc., etc.) for various 
actions, including, e.g., patent infringement.17 While courts have not yet 
considered all provisions of the GPLv2.0 specifically, courts have generally 
 
 10. Id. at 10, “Infosys employees used and copied the decompiled code on numerous occasions, for 
commercial gain, in their work for Ameriprise”. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See, e.g., Y. Peter Kang, XimpleWare, Versata Settle Insurance Software IP Dispute, LAW360, 
(Februrary 11, 2015, 6:24 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/620898/ximpleware-versata-settle-
insurance-software-ip-dispute. 
 13. VTD-XML: The Future of XML Processing, SOURCEFORGE, http://vtd-xml.sourceforge.net/. 
  14. See, e.g., GNU General Public License , version 2, GNU Operating System (June 1991), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html.  
3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, under Section 2) in object code or executable 
form under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following: 
a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code, which must be distributed under 
the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or, 
 . . .  
This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into proprietary programs. 
 15. Complaint at 9, Ximpleware, Inc., v. Versata Software, Inc., et al., No. 3:13-cv-05160-SI (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (“During the prosecution of that lawsuit, Ameriprise informed XimpleWare that it had 
discovered portions of XimpleWare’s GPL-licensed Source Code in the source code of Versata’s DCM 
product”). 
 16. Id. at 10-11. 
 17. Complaint at 9-14, Ximpleware, Inc., v. Versata Software, Inc., et al., No. 5:13-cv-05161-PSG 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013). 
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expressed a willingness to enforce open source licenses.18 For example, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit enforced the Artistic License in 
Jacobsen v. Katzer.19 In face of all these actions, each of the XimpleWare 
parties eventually settled their respective litigations.20 




FIGURE 1: Simplified XimpleWare Litigation Topology 
 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer and Kamind Associates, Inc., 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Copyright holders who engage in open source licensing have the right to control the modification and 
distribution of copyrighted material.”). Note, however, that CAFC considered the Artistic License, rather 
than the GPL, in Katzer. While at least some of the GPL’s provisions are likely enforceable, some, such 
as the copyleft implications for dynamic linking, remain quite controversial.  
 20. See, e.g., Peter Kang, XimpleWare, Versata Settle Insurance Software IP Dispute, Law360 (Feb. 
11, 2015, 6:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620898/XimpleWare-versata-settle-insurance-
software-ip-dispute.  
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What can a practitioner discern from this pattern? Was it prudent for 
Ameriprise to inform XimpleWare of Versata’s breach? Did Ameriprise’s 
disclosure to XimpleWare improve Ameriprise’s bargaining position? What 
could Versata have done differently to mitigate such behavior? This Article 
provides an analytical framework for considering and answering, or at least 
clarifying, these questions. 
B. Generalized Litigation Topology 
Figure 2 abstracts from the XimpleWare fact pattern provided above to 
illustrate a more generalized set of relationships. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Generalized Strategic Litigation “Spatial” Topology 
 
In this diagram, the arrows represent “influence” pressures, which may 
take the form of litigation, but may also represent more general methods of 
coercion (e.g., they may include “market pressures” as when customers elect 
a substitute product). The reader may find it useful to print this diagram and 
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Parties 
ΠA: The “plaintiff” party(ies) (e.g., Versata) bringing the initial action, 
or having cause for action, A1 against the “defendant” party(ies) Δ; 
Δ: The “defendant” party(ies) (e.g., Ameriprise) to ΠA’s action; 
ΠB: The true copyright owner (e.g., XimpleWare) of the open source 
software distributed in a non-compliant fashion by ΠA; and 
C: The “customers” of ΠA who use ΠA’s non-compliant software (as in 
XimpleWare Δ may also be a member of C). 
 
Influence Pressures (e.g., Actions / Causes for Action) 
A1: The initial action, or basis for action, by ΠA against Δ; 
B1: Δ’s action, which may be directly responsive to A1, e.g., a 
counterclaim, brought against ΠA; 
C1, C2: The copyright owner ΠB’s action, or basis for action, against 
ΠA and Δ respectively (note that in many fact pattern variations C2 will 
not exist); 
C3: The copyright owner ΠB’s action, or basis for action, against the 
downstream customers C of ΠA; and 
D1: The responsive action, or pressured response, by the downstream 
customers C against ΠA. 
 
Note that not all of the influence pressures may be present at the same 
time (initially, e.g., there may only be A1). 
Section II analyzes this topology to discern general principles 
governing Δ’s behavior when threatening ΠA with disclosure of ΠA’s open 
source violation. Section III then briefly considers countermeasures to these 
principles available to ΠA. 
II. COMPLIANCE-BASED DEFENSE TACTICS 
This Section focuses upon Δ’s perspective, specifically, how Δ may 
mitigate or otherwise influence A1 in view of the pressures upon ΠA 
following disclosure. Particularly, unlike other compliance-based tactics, 
e.g., situations where Δ has not itself directly suffered harm, Δ may often 
threaten ΠA without fearing allegations of extortion. Δ will often be a third 
party-beneficiary of the open source license and most jurisdictions will not 
consider the threat of a legitimate third-party claim (and in some cases, even 
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a questionable claim) an extortive act.21 As discussed in greater detail below, 
such claims will have the incidental effect of informing ΠB of the 
noncompliance and therefore, are often coeval with threatening such 
notification. This freedom permits Δ greater latitude when structuring its 
threat as compared to other compliance-based tactics susceptible to extortion 
counter actions.22 
Thus, let us assume that Δ is rational, i.e., that Δ is not merely seeking 
to punitively harm ΠA by disclosing the violation without consideration to 
the consequences.23 Rather, Δ seeks to make a credible threat to ΠA regarding 
the disclosure, likely to precipitate a favorable conclusion of A1 for Δ. ΠA 
will only consider such a threat credible and take action regarding A1 if: 1) 
the resultant harm to ΠA from the disclosure will meaningfully compel ΠA 
 
 21. In XimpleWare specifically, the defendant Ameriprise sought to compel Versata to disclose its 
source code in compliance with the GPL as a third party beneficiary. Though the court did not ultimately 
rule on the motion, a favorable ruling would have been likely in view of the other case law identified 
herein. See, e.g., Remand Order at 9, Versata Software, Inc., v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (2014) (No.A-
1-14-cv-12-ss), 2014 2014 WL 950065 (“Having found no basis for federal jurisdiction over this claim, 
the Court need not determine whether Ameriprise has standing to enforce the GPL as a third-party 
beneficiary.”); See also GPL_response, Versata Software, Inc., v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (2014) 
(No.A-1-14-cv-12-ss), 2014 WL 950065 (“Ameriprise asserts that it is a third-party beneficiary of the 
GNU General Public License (Doc. No. 9-3, the ‘GPL’) and as such is entitled to receive the source code 
to Versata’s software product called, Distribution Channel Management (‘DCM’). Pursuant to the GPL, 
any party who, like Versata, distributes software that incorporates code licensed under the GPL must 
provide all the source code for the software being distributed, including formerly proprietary code. 
Ameriprise seeks to enforce the contractual right requiring Versata to produce its DCM source code to 
Ameriprise. Versata incorrectly asserts that copyright law preempts Ameriprise’s claim to the source 
code. Ameriprise’s claim to be a third-party beneficiary of the GPL, however, is not preempted because 
the rights granted by the GPL are essentially the opposite of copyright and, in particular, there is no 
equivalent third-party-beneficiary claim in copyright law”).  
 22. Note that this third party beneficiary basis may serve to obviate claims of extortion by ΠA as Δ 
is merely “exercising its rights”. Generally, a threat to file a lawsuit, even if made in bad faith, does not 
constitute extortion. As noted by Justice Holmes, “‘As a general rule, even if subject to some exceptions, 
what you may do in a certain event you may threaten to do, that is, give warning of your intention to do 
in that event, and thus allow the other person the chance of avoiding the consequences.’” McKay v. Retail 
Auto. Salesmen’s Local Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 321 (1940) (quoting Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 
Mass. 92, 107 (1896)), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941); See also, e.g., U.S. v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 
1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A threat to litigate, by itself, is not necessarily “wrongful” within the 
meaning of the Hobbs Act. After all, under our system, parties are encouraged to resort to courts for the 
redress of wrongs and the enforcement of rights.”);  
Accordingly, while for simplicity, this Article often characterizes Δ’s threat to ΠA as “I’ll tell 
ΠB”, in practice, the threat would more typically resemble “I’ll file my third party beneficiary 
counterclaim indirectly notifying ΠB”. The latter may be especially likely in jurisdictions, such as 
California, affording ΠA a civil cause of action for extortion. 
 23. Some practitioners have scoffed to the Author at this level of analysis, responding (to 
paraphrase) “isn’t it enough just to have one more vehicle for hurting the other fellow?” Such a crude 
assessment ignores the possibility that disclosure may irrevocably escalate the situation, forcing a state 
of total-war between otherwise reconcilable parties. Still, in some situations, practitioners may be inclined 
to disclose without threatening to avoid allegations of extortion. Distinguishing extortion from settlement 
bargaining may depend upon the third party beneficiary options under B1, the manner in which Δ makes 
ΠA aware of the noncompliance, the relationship between the violation an A1, and case law in the relevant 
jurisdiction. As previously discussed, most courts would likely favor the third party beneficiary claim.  
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to resolve A1; and 2) the harm to Δ resulting from the disclosure does not 
itself obviate Δ’s reasons for disclosing.24 These requirements are referred to 
as the “credibility conditions” herein and are discussed in greater detail in 
Section II.A.25 
With an eye to these credibility conditions, Δ will consider: 1) is it 
worthwhile for Δ to even pose the threat (Section II.B); and if so, 2) how 
should Δ pose the threat to ΠA so that the threat is most effective (Section 
II.C)? Phrased differently, Δ, as a rational actor, will reason backward from 
ΠA’s perceived consequences of the disclosure to determine if it is worth 
threatening to disclose (Section II.B). If it is worth threatening to disclose, Δ 
should present the threat to ΠA so as to maximize Δ’s bargaining gains 
(Section II.C). 
A. Qualitative Assessment of the Threat Credibility Conditions 
To reiterate, for Δ’s disclosure threat to ΠA to be effective, ΠA must 
believe two things: 
 
Condition 1: Disclosure will substantially mitigate ΠA’s willingness to 
pursue A1; and 
Condition 2: Disclosure will not unreasonably expose Δ to risk. 
 
Let us restate these conditions more rigorously in terms of pseudo-
algebraic parameters. These parameters will allow us to more succinctly 
categorize the effects of each party’s actions.26 Just as we’ve assumed that Δ 
 
 24. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE, Introduction Pg. 3 (“But in the world 
of coercive diplomacy, threats and assurances must be balanced through a process of clear and credible 
signaling, and enforceable bargains must be struck short of total defeat or victory for either side. Without 
credible threats, coercion is obviously ineffective. But what is less well understood is that coercion is 
also unlikely to be effective without simultaneously transmitted credible assurances that the threat 
is fully conditional upon the target’s behavior and that the target’s key security interests will not be 
harmed if it complies with the demands of those leveling the threats. Without receiving both threats 
and assurances in concert, the target of a coercive threat has little incentive to comply with the 
demands being made,” emphasis added). 
 25. Indeed, that the conditions are in fact true, and not simply perceived as true, may be more 
effective. Thomas Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 281-306 (1956) (“How 
does one person make another believe something? The answer depends importantly on the factual 
question, ‘Is it true?’ It is easier to prove the truth of something that is true than of something false.”). 
 26. When performing analysis such as these, the author rarely adheres to a “strict” application of 
game theory. Indeed, some researchers question if it if even possible to apply game theory in practical 
contexts. See, e.g., Ariel D. Procaccia, Game Theory Is Useful, Except When It Is Not, SYMPOSIUM 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 31, 2013) http://www.symposium-magazine.com/game-theory-is-useful-except-when-
it-is-not-ariel-d-procaccia/. The Author often references the “Surprise Hanging Paradox” as an example 
of an over-confident application of induction-style game theory arguments. See, Unexpected hanging 
paradox, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox (last visited Nov. 15, 
2016); See also, e.g., How Common Sense May Trump Game Theory 
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is rational, let us assume that ΠA is rational (we will relax these assumptions 
as we proceed). 
Regarding the first condition, assume that ΠA has initiated or threatened 
A1 because ΠA’s perceived benefit to initiating A1 (BenefitA1) exceeds ΠA’s 
perceived cost for initiating A1 (CostA1), i.e.: 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑨𝟏 > 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑨𝟏  (1) 
 
For example, ΠA may be willing to pay $2 Million in attorney fees 
(CostA1) for a $40 Million judgment (BenefitA1). Absent action by Δ, this cost 
may simply be ΠA’s litigation expenses. If ΠA believes that it will recover 
attorney fees, these expenses may be perceived as nominal or zero. To make 
ΠA’s pursuit of A1 untenable, or at least very unpalatable, Δ should seek to 
increase the additional cost to ΠA from the open source violation disclosure 
(Disclosure_CostΠA) so as to negate BenefitA1. Preferably, ΠA should believe 
at the time Δ poses the threat that: 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑨𝟏 < 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑨𝟏 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜫𝑨  (2) 
 
If Equation (2) is true, then the threat to disclose to ΠA would credibly 
obviate the benefit of A1. Accordingly, ΠA would be unreasonable to ignore 
the threat. If Equation (2) is not true, then ΠA should be indifferent to Δ’s 
threat. 
Setting aside the first condition, for now, the second credibility 
condition requires that Δ not unreasonably expose itself to risk by making 
the disclosure. Particularly, as evidenced by C2, the disclosure may likewise 
result in Δ becoming subject to suit by ΠB. In addition, Δ may become 
exposed to procedural costs/risks if it discloses, e.g., where a protective order 
or nondisclosure agreement is in place prohibiting such disclosures (See, 
Section II.C.2 infra). These costs to Δ resulting from the disclosure are 
cumulatively referred to herein as Disclosure_CostΔ.27 If Disclosure_CostΔ 
is much greater than the loss Δ would suffer if ΠA succeeds in A1 
(A1_LossΔ), then it is not credible that Δ would disclose and incur the 
 
https://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2014/09/28/how-common-sense-may-trump-game-theory/ (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2016). Accordingly, the author instead finds it useful to use quantitative relations only 
insofar as they inform more qualitative assessments, hence, “pseudo-algebraic” reasoning. 
 27. To simplify, let us incorporate the probability of these costs being incurred into their qualitative 
value (e.g., discounting based upon their likelihood and Δ’s risk aversion, etc.). A practitioner presented 
with very specific facts may instead consider the variance associated with each parameter’s probability 
in their analysis. 
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additional Disclosure_CostΔ.28 Stated differently, if A1 only presents a de 
minimis harm to Δ, but disclosure presents a very great harm, why would Δ 
put itself in jeopardy of such a greater harm to avoid a smaller harm?29 Thus, 
the second credibility condition appears to imply that ΠA believe: 
 
𝐴1_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝚫 ≫ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝚫  (3) 
 
However, this statement only captures a subset of the circumstances 
under which the second condition would be credible. As mentioned, ΠA will 
expect Δ to suffer both A1_LossΔ and Disclosure_CostΔ following 
disclosure.30 Accordingly, a more accurate statement of the second condition 
would reflect ΠA’s belief that Δ is willing to bear both A1_LossΔ and 
Disclosure_CostΔ following disclosure. This “willingness” is contextual. For 
example, if A1_LossΔ will clearly bankrupt Δ then what reason has Δ to fear 
Disclosure_CostΔ? The second condition becomes irrelevant – Δ has nothing 
to lose and only something to gain by disclosing. Similar contextual 
variations will scale terms in the inequality. To account for this contextual 
effect, let us introduce a proportional weighting factor Ccontext adjusting 
Disclosure_CostΔ to account for ΠA’s belief in Δ’s appreciation of future 
losses resulting from the disclosure. 
 
𝐴1_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝚫 >  𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝚫  (4) 
 
Thus, in the bankruptcy scenario discussed above, Ccontext will be 0, as 
Δ will consider the additional Disclosure_CostΔ irrelevant. Similarly, if 
Disclosure_CostΔ presents a finite, manageable harm, Ccontext becomes 1. If 
ΠA relaxes Δ’s rationality (e.g., as the parties approach an irrational state of 
total conflict) Ccontext can become < 1, etc. 
Note that Ccontext has a (roughly) inverse effect upon the first condition. 
When Ccontext is 0, as in the bankruptcy scenario, Δ may as well enter a state 
 
 28. Note that A1_LossΔ includes both the effects of judgment against Δ as well as Δ’s cost to defend. 
This asymmetry relative to CostA1 will become relevant in the subsequent discussion of bargaining power. 
To restate the matter more explicitly, increasing CostA1 (e.g., increasing ΠA’s attorneys’ fees) lowers the 
stakes for ΠA,, but increasing A1_LossΔ (e.g., increasing Δ’s attorneys’ fees) increases the stakes for Δ. 
 29. In other words, the response would be disproportionate. Typically, Menelaus’ waging massive 
inter-state warfare is a disproportionate response to the isolated act of Helen’s infidelity. Of course, these 
things happen, they’re just not rational. Ccontext will be used to relax rationality in the subsequent sections. 
 30. To rephrase the observation, ΠA will generally believe the threat if Δ’s end condition is 
plausible. Not only a small Disclosure_CostΔ but any Disclosure_CostΔ meeting that condition will 
suffice.  
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of total conflict (i.e., the motive is no longer to influence ΠA, but simply to 
cause harm). Accordingly, let us state the final, pseudo-algebraic parameter 
representations of the credibility conditions as follows: 
 
Condition 1: 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑨𝟏 <
(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑨𝟏+𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜫𝑨)
𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡
  (5) 
Condition 2: 𝐴1_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝚫 >  𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝚫  (6) 
 
As mentioned in the preceding footnote, this framework is clearly not 
intended to establish “hard and absolute” numerical rules and relationships. 
The amorphous character of Ccontext will require the practitioner to carefully 
consider their particular situation before attempting to assign a numerical 
value.31 Indeed, the value of Ccontext in Condition 1 may not be exactly the 
same in Condition 2, and separate parameters may be more suitable. For this 
Article’s purposes, however, this framework will permit us to more 
rigorously evaluate the consequence to Δ’s threat from each of the legal 
considerations. 
Thus, Conditions 1 and 2 inform Δ’s decision to disclose and the 
threat’s persuasive effect upon ΠA. Section II.B focuses on Condition 1, 
discussing how Δ can maximize Disclosure_CostΠA and minimize Ccontext so 
as to persuade ΠA that disclosure will cause ΠA genuine harm (in other 
words, “is posing the threat worthwhile to Δ?”). Section II.C then focuses on 
both Conditions 1 and 2, discussing how Δ can minimize Disclosure_CostΔ 
and again minimize Ccontext by posing the threat in a credible manner (in other 
words, “how should Δ pose the threat?”). As discussed in Section II.C, some 
of these actions (e.g., purchasing ΠB’s copyright) may have the secondary 
effect of also increasing Disclosure_CostΠA. 
B. Influencing A1 - “Is Threatening Worthwhile”? 
With regard to Condition 1, Δ should maximize Disclosure_CostΠA and 
minimize Ccontext. Disclosure_CostΠA generally depends upon three 
consequences following from the disclosure: 
1) The remedies sought by ΠB against ΠA; 
 
 31. Consider, e.g., a somewhat particular situation where Δ’s board of directors anticipate declaring 
bankruptcy and pursuing a new venture dependent upon the goodwill of ΠA. Thus, the preceding 
motivations following from bankruptcy no longer apply here and Ccontext is no longer 0. The parameter’s 
new value will depend upon how much the disclosure jeopardizes the future venture, a likely qualitative, 
amorphous consideration. In application, the practitioner will need to consider their specific 
circumstances. 
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2) Newly available counterclaims B1 by Δ against ΠA; and 
3) Pressures D1 from downstream customers C precipitated by C3. 
The following sections consider these consequences in turn. 
1. The Remedies Sought by ΠB Against ΠA 
An open source license’s breach may precipitate several causes of 
action in C1. In past cases, direct copyright infringement, indirect copyright 
infringement, violation of the Lanham Act § 43, unfair competition, breach 
of contract, tortious interference with business relations / intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage, misappropriation, breach 
of implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair dealing, unjust enrichment, etc. 
have all appeared.32 Naturally, plaintiffs typically seek both injunctive and 
monetary relief for these causes of action where available.33 It is important 
that Δ carefully consider the character of the injunctive and monetary relief 
sought by ΠB as these will inform value of Disclosure_CostΠA. Additionally, 
this relief will also influence the likelihood that ΠB will bring the action C1 
in the first place (indeed the foundation for Δ’s threat to ΠA). To simplify, 
let us assume that this probability is already reflected within 
Disclosure_CostΠA , since they are (to a certain extent) positively correlated 
(i.e., the more value ΠB ascribes to the action C1, the more likely ΠB is to 
bring the action C1). Thus, the greater the consequences to ΠA from ΠB’s 
injunctive and monetary relief, the higher Disclosure_CostΠA. 
a. Injunctive Relief 
In most open source breach scenarios, the preferred relief is injunctive. 
In Jacobsen v. Katzer, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit upheld a request for preliminary injunction where the defendant had 
not complied with the terms of the Artistic License.34 The court observed 
that in many cases, monetary damages would not be available to an open 
source plaintiff as there were no lost profits associated with the breach: 
Copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money 
damages alone do not support or enforce that right. The choice to exact 
consideration in the form of compliance with the open source requirements 
of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than as a dollar 
denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal recognition. Indeed, because a 
calculation of damages is inherently speculative, these types of license 
 
 32. E.g., Complaint at 1, Ximpleware, Inc., v. Versata Software, Inc., et al., No. 3:13-cv-05160-SI 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (this particular list is taken in part from the XimpleWare complaint). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376. 
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restrictions might well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce 
through injunctive relief.35 
For a permissive license, e.g., the MIT or BSD license, simply including 
an absent copyright notice may suffice to cure the deficiency. Consequently, 
the injunctive relief for these licenses typically present poor vehicles for 
increasing Disclosure_CostΠA, as compliance may simply be a tedious 
inconvenience for ΠA and C. While not substantial, such smaller compliance 
costs may still serve Δ’s purposes if BenefitA1 is “low” or CostA1 is “high”. 
Indeed, in Jacobsen v. Katzer, the defendant incurred both the costs of a 
district court and federal appeal by simply failing to include the required 
notice.36 Such small stakes litigation will likely be the exception, rather than 
the rule, however, given the high costs involved in ΠA’s bringing legal 
action. 
In higher stakes litigation, Δ would need a more compelling violation if 
Δ intends to rely upon the injunction to increase Disclosure_CostΠA. Less 
permissive open source licenses in conjunction with ΠA’s business structure, 
may serve this purpose. For example, some open source licenses include 
strong copyleft requirements (e.g., the GPL or Sleepycat licenses). These 
copyleft provisions may require not only that the original open source code 
be made available in source code form, but that ΠA provide its entire 
commercial product (or a substantial portion) in source code form.37 Whether 
this is the case will depend upon the exact terms of the license and the nature 
of ΠA’s commercial product.38 Requiring that ΠA disclose its source code 
 
 35. Id. at 1382 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. For example, the GPL has always been viewed as applying to both statically and dynamically 
linked libraries, See Frequently Asked Questions about the GNU Licenses, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM 
(May 26, 2016) http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GPLStaticVsDynamic (05/26/2016) 
(“Does the GPL have different requirements for statically vs dynamically linked modules with a covered 
work? (#GPLStaticVsDynamic) No. Linking a GPL covered work statically or dynamically with other 
modules is making a combined work based on the GPL covered work. Thus, the terms and conditions of 
the GNU General Public License cover the whole combination.). See also GNU GENERAL PUBLIC 
LICENSE, version 2, License, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html# (05/26/2016) (What legal 
issues come up if I use GPL-incompatible libraries with GPL software?”). The consequences of a 
violation in this context will need to be carefully evaluated by Δ. If the linking is to an isolated module 
of ΠA’s product, then only that module will be subject to the GPL. 
 38. To maximize Disclosure_CostΠA the open source code would ideally be interwoven with the 
commercial product such that the license’s terms apply to the product’s entirety and such that the open 
source code cannot be easily separated or substituted. When this is not the case, however, the violation 
may still suffice to raise Disclosure_CostΠA so long as ΠB has a basis for demonstrating sufficient 
damages. Consider a violation of the GPLv2.0. In some ways, whether the code was dynamically linked, 
statically linked, or copied directly is irrelevant. This is because when ΠB experiences grave financial 
harm from the violation, that harm is unlikely to arise from the infringement itself (since compliant 
distributions were freely available). Rather, ΠB’s financial interest arises from secondary factors, such as 
the market or ΠB’s business structure. But if this the character of the harm, then another basis (e.g., an 
unfair competition claim) probably suffices to Disclosure_CostΠA.  
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may have devastating consequences for ΠA. For example, where ΠA operates 
in the defense industry or in a litigious patent market, source code 
availability may fail to comply with the DFARs or expose ΠA to an 
infringement action, respectively.39 Perhaps more importantly, copyleft 
provisions may also deny the addition of commercial terms.40 These 
commercial terms may have been required to make ΠA’s product profitable. 
Much service software includes nontrivial royalty determinations based 
upon the character of the customer’s usage.41 Requiring these terms’ removal 
could be devastating to ΠA. 
Thus, an injunction requiring compliance with a copyleft license may 
deny ΠA the enjoyment of a market advantage it previously held relative to 
its competitors. Disclosure_CostΠA will then include at least: 1) the future 
loss of this advantage; 2) the remediation cost for the past violations; and 3) 
reputational harm from those who would have benefited from the earlier 
compliance. Indeed, if financial data regarding ΠA’s past profits are 
available, Δ would likely seek to ascertain the loss in market advantage to 
clarify Disclosure_CostΠA. Similarly, Δ should be able to readily ascertain 
the consequences to existing market share when remediating (discussed in 
greater detail below with respect to C3 and D1). 
Despite these potentially onerous outcomes, there may be factors 
insulating ΠA from monetary damage flowing from the injunction. 
Obviously, insurance can provide such insulation, but prolonged 
noncompliance itself may also serve to insulate ΠA from these injunctive 
damages. Particularly, being the “first to market” is often the dispositive 
factor in software sales as the first entrant may displace opportunities for 
follow-on entrants.42 ΠA may have eliminated the competition in this manner 
 
 39. See GNU General Public License, version 2, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (June, 1991), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html (“(b) You must cause any work that you 
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, 
to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License”). See, e.g. 
Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open Source Software (OSS), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/OSSFAQ/2009OSS.pdf (“The use of any software 
without appropriate maintenance and support presents an information assurance risk. Before approving 
the use of software (including OSS), system/program managers, and ultimately Designated Approving 
Authorities (DAAs), must ensure that the plan for software support (e.g., commercial or Government 
program office support) is adequate for mission need.”). 
 40. See GNU General Public License, version 2, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (June, 1991), 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html (“(b) You must cause any work that you 
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, 
to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License”).  
 41. Consider, e.g., the varied licensing terms of SAP PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP NETWORK LICENSES 
http://go.sap.com/product/plm/product-stewardship-network.licensing-purchasing.html. 
 42. The first mover advantage is a very market-centric analysis and subject to many exceptions. 
Consider, Fernando Suarez & Gianvito Lanzolla, The Half-Truth of First-Mover Advantage, HARV. BUS. 
REV., (Apr. 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/04/the-half- truth-of- first-mover- advantage. 
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by virtue of the noncompliance (e.g., repurposing an already existing open 
source solution rather than developing its own from scratch). Being forced 
to now comply, after the competition is gone, would do little to raise 
Disclosure_CostΠA, unless that competition returns. 
If this is the situation, Δ should identify competitors and new entrants 
who may be able to take advantage of ΠA’s forced compliance via injunction. 
A competitor who may have “given up” may now find that it has the 
advantage by virtue of its (mistakenly) late-to-market, proprietary solution 
which does not rely upon the open source component. Where ΠA’s product 
is not purely software (e.g., firmware or hardware), Δ can be somewhat more 
confident that this market displacement has less insulating effect (though this 
will depend upon the context).43 In any event, if this insulating effect is large, 
Δ should consider whether antitrust actions, or unfair business competition 
actions, will suffice to return Disclosure_CostΠA to its pre-insulation value. 
b. Monetary Relief 
As discussed above in relation to Jacobsen v. Katzer, the most common 
remedy for an open source violation may be injunctive relief. As the software 
was generally available for “free”, permissive open source licenses will 
typically result in few, if any, monetary damages for copyright infringement, 
save the possibility of some statutory damages.44 To achieve substantial 
monetary damages under the copyright, tortious interference with business 
relations, antitrust, and other causes of action, ΠB must operate its business 
such that ΠA’s abuse of the license resulted in a tangible profit loss to ΠB. 
ΠB’s profit loss may occur in several ways. Certainly, unfair 
competition may present opportunities for monetary damages in the form of 
lost profits, though Δ should consider what ΠB will need to prove to 
demonstrate this market loss.45 Where ΠB offered the open source software 
under a “dual license” allowing licensees to accept the software under either 
the open source license or a commercial license, the monetary damages may 
 
 43. Id. While not a universal rule, such products are often subject to slower change, and 
consequently in the “calmer waters” referenced in this article. 
 44. Statutory damages require that ΠB have the foresight to register their work and provide $750 to 
$30,000 per infringement of the work and an additional $150,000 for willful infringement. See, 17 U.S.C. 
§504(c) (1947). However, statutory damages will often not be the best vehicle for increasing 
Disclosure_CostΠA, as the damages are calculated based upon the number of copyrighted works and 
number of infringers, but not the number of incidents of infringement. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., 
Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 45. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code, § 3345(b) (unfair competition law is one in which the trier of fact “is 
authorized by statute to impose a fine, or a civil penalty or other penalty, or any other remedy the purpose 
or effect of which is to punish or deter . . .”); See also, Bank of the West v. Superior Court 2 Cal.4th 1254, 
1267 (1992) (indicating that the remedy may have a “deterrent purpose and effect”).  
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be more certain.46 ΠA’s failure to take either license in this scenario, will 
likely result in a quantifiable unjust enrichment to ΠA or lost profits to ΠB. 
Reputational harm may itself precipitate financial consequences to ΠA, 
even when remediation is de minimis. Indeed, in some communities, callous 
failure to comply with de minimis obligations may result in reputational harm 
because they are de minimis.47 This reputational harm may precipitate 
customer departures and jeopardize ΠA’s participation in future open source 
projects.48 In this respect, to the extent that Δ can influence media attention 
and otherwise call attention to the breach, Δ may be able to increase ΠA’s 
perception of Disclosure_CostΠA.49 
2. New Counterclaims B1 
In some situations, disclosure may permit Δ additional counterclaims 
against ΠA that may increase Disclosure_CostΠA. Δ’s ability to bring 
additional counterclaims depends upon the character of the open source 
deficiency and Δ’s relationship to ΠA. For example, as previously discussed, 
Δ may assert that it was the third party beneficiary of a copyleft open source 
license, particularly where there was an obligation to disclose source code or 
provide specific terms to downstream recipients (indeed, as discussed in the 
footnotes, such a counterclaim may be necessary to prevent the threat’s 
characterization as extortion). 
Where Δ is a customer of ΠA, ΠA may have required Δ to indemnify ΠA 
or to disclaim liability for open source noncompliance. Even in these 
 
 46. For example, in Oracle America v. Google, 750 F.3d 1339, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Oracle 
provided the Java API under either the GPL open source license or a commercial license. Arguably, in 
this situation, a customer’s unwillingness to comply with the GPL’s restrictive character, or to take a 
commercial license, reduced the market for the commercial license (even if the customer were willing to 
comply with the GPL a downstream customer may have preferred the commercial license). See Exhibit 
G, Oracle America v. Google, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 1571-8) 3:10-cv-03561 (“I determined 
that Oracle’s lost profits from lost Java ME license agreements with third parties totaled $475 million.”). 
This argument, however, requires that the circumstances and licensing environment encourage such an 
either-or behavior between the open and commercial license.  
 47. Consider the example of Jacobsen v. Katzer (“The software underlying such an important legal 
dispute is almost charmingly inconsequential from a commercial point of view - model railroad software. 
But to the litigants, the stakes were high relative to their resources and their commitment to that niche. 
The plaintiff, Robert Jacobsen, is a software developer member of the Java Model Railroad Interface 
(JMRI) Project, and the defendant, Matthew Katzer, is the owner of a proprietary vendor of model train 
software called KAMIND associates, d/b/a KAM Industries.”) Andy Updegrove, A Big Victory for 
F/OSS: Jacobsen v Katzer is Settled, THE STANDARDS BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=201002190850472. 
 48. Such participation may often be part of a business strategy, e.g., in a “razor / razor-blade” 
business model. 
 49. For example, a court would generally be unlikely to entertain a criminal allegation under the 
DMCA against an open source violation, but the public media and community consequences following 
from such an accusation may suffice to raise Disclosure_CostΠA.  
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circumstances, however, disclosure may provide the evidentiary basis for Δ 
to bring an antitrust action.50 Such an action’s effectiveness will depend upon 
the market posture of the parties. As discussed in the following section, Δ 
may seek to align its post-disclosure position with C as much as possible, or 
at least cause ΠA to perceive as much, to increase the apparent value of 
Disclosure_CostΠA. 
Still, in most contexts, it is unlikely that B1 will be the primary basis 
for increasing Disclosure_CostΠA, because Δ is neither the copyright owner 
nor the market participant originally motivated to develop the open source 
software.51 Instead, as discussed in greater detail below, if Δ acquires the 
copyright to the open source component from ΠB, Δ may subsume C1, C2, 
and C3 within B1 so as to maximize Disclosure_CostΠA. 
3. Pressures from Downstream Customers D1 
ΠA’s awareness of the consequent D1 pressures will increase 
Disclosure_CostΠA. As D1 directly follows from the character of C3 (e.g., 
the resultant pressures when, and if, customers become subject to an 
injunctive order) Δ may analyze C3 as a proxy for D1 to a certain extent. To 
this end, Δ should consider if and how ΠB will bring C3. Some ΠBs may 
simply ignore C, not wishing to suffer reputational harm in the community 
by suing end customers (e.g., where ΠB is an educational nonprofit). 
Conversely, some ΠBs may have no choice but to pursue action against C 
(e.g., where ΠB is a large corporation whose shareholders and board compel 
directors to recapture lost profits). In some instances, C3 may not be present, 
depending upon the customer behavior.52 Accordingly, Δ should consider the 
character of ΠB when analyzing C3 and, in turn, D1. 
ΠA will likely have indemnified itself or disclaimed any warranty 
regarding copyright infringement in its agreements with customers C. 
 
 50. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that any “false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact –(a) which is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake” is illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). The defendant may seek damages and 
an injunction. Additionally, Section 4 of the Clayton Act 1914 allows for the recovery of damages by 
“any person injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” 15 
U.S.C. 15(a) (2012). The claimant need merely demonstrate that “injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful” Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 US 477, 489 (1977). 
 51. Again, as mentioned elsewhere herein, a third party beneficiary counterclaim’s greatest value 
may be in mitigating extortion allegations, effectively reducing Disclosure_CostΔ. See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Generally, a threat to file a lawsuit, even if made in 
bad faith, does not constitute extortion).  
 52. For example, internal use and distribution does not trigger the copyleft obligations of many 
otherwise onerous licenses, such as the GPL license. If the customers are not themselves distributing 
infringing versions, but merely using internal copies, ΠB may have no credible basis for bringing an action 
against them. 
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Prudent Cs will have stipulated to these terms only subject to proper open 
source diligence, representations and warranties, etc. by ΠA. The transaction 
costs involved in litigating these provisions, even if simply to establish that 
they are enforceable, may contribute to Disclosure_CostΠA. Cs who have not 
taken such precautions may still exert considerable pressure by selecting an 
alternative provider than ΠA. Since Δ may not know the character or scope 
of C and C’s agreement with ΠA, Δ should make clear to ΠA that it will 
apprise ΠB of as many Cs as possible if it discloses. Accordingly, any 
customer lists uncovered during A1’s discovery, which are not subject to a 
protective order, may be especially useful in this regard (See Section II.C.2.b 
below). Naturally, however, such behavior is more likely to be condemned 
in a protective order or in action seeking to determine that Δ’s threat 
constitutes extortion (e.g., that it was “wrongful” by the terms of some 
extortion laws). 
In some instances, ΠA and Δ may share customers within C. In these 
circumstances, Δ should consider whether C3 would simply provide Δ 
greater market share, or would alienate customers C against Δ. This 
alienation may be particularly acute if the Cs learn that Δ was the source of 
the disclosure to ΠB. Accordingly, Δ may preemptively notify shared 
customers C and provide them with an opportunity to comply/remediate, 
before making the threat to ΠA. Naturally, the timing and character of such 
a warning will depend upon C’s capacity to remediate, and Δ’s concern that 
C will prematurely warn ΠA. Such premature warning may cause ΠA to 
acquire the copyright from ΠB before Δ has had a chance to make its own 
offer. Consequently, if Δ is considering purchasing the copyright from ΠB 
(discussed in detail below in Section II.C.1), Δ should make its purchase 
attempt before issuing a warning to any of C. 
C. Influencing A1 - “How Should Δ Threaten”? 
As the threat’s effectiveness depends upon ΠA’s perception of 
Conditions 1 and 2 being true, the manner in which Δ poses the threat is of 
considerable importance. Certainly, Δ’s characterization of each of the 
parameters in Conditions 1 and 2 will influence ΠA as they will make the 
threat more credible. But the goal is not simply to make ΠA feel threatened, 
but to compel ΠA to abandon A1. If Δ loses sight of this broader goal, posing 
the threat indelicately, ΠA may assume Δ intends to enter a state of total war. 
ΠA may begin remediating the violation or seek to acquire the open source 
copyright from ΠB, without considering whether dropping A1 would instead 
be more economical. Anticipating this scenario, Δ must consider the 
likelihood of ΠB’s consenting to sell the copyright to ΠA before making the 
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threat to ΠA. In some circumstances, for example, where such a sale to ΠA is 
likely, Δ may seek to preemptively acquire ΠB’s copyright itself before 
making the threat. 
1. Acquiring the Copyright 
Many circumstances will compel Δ to attempt to acquire ΠB’s copyright 
in the open source software. If ΠB’s purchase price is low, if 
Disclosure_CostΔ is unacceptably high, or if it is unlikely that ΠB will take 
action against ΠA or C, then Δ should attempt to acquire ownership of ΠB’s 
copyright before posing the disclosure threat to ΠA.53 Naturally, Δ will 
probably make the offer through an intermediary so that ΠB does not infer 
ΠA or Δ’s noncompliance. Such an inference may cause ΠB to increase its 
asking price or to initiate action before Δ has made its threat to ΠA. How 
much should Δ be willing to offer ΠB? If ΠB rejects Δ’s offer, should Δ be 
concerned that ΠB will accept ΠA’s offer after Δ threatens ΠA? The following 
section considers each party’s ability to acquire the copyright (their 
“purchase price capacity”) to answer these questions. 
a. Purchase Price Capacity 
Figure 3 generally illustrates Δ and ΠA’s relative purchase price 
capacities (shaded regions) for ΠB’s open source copyright. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Purchase Price Capacity 
 
 53. N.B., however, that Δ’s acquiring the copyright may remove some of the antitrust and tortious 
interference causes of action discussed above as it was ΠB and not Δ who suffered theses harms. In these 
situations, Δ may attempt to involve ΠB in the action for those causes which Δ cannot avail itself to 
increase Disclosure_CostΠA.  
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Figure 3 is simply a graphical representation of the following pseudo-
algebraic Equations 7 and 8:54 
 
𝚷𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑨 = Max(0, 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐴1 
+ 𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑨   
+ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝛱𝐴  
−Cost𝐴1 ) 
(7) 
𝚫𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐴1𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠Δ 





𝑨  and ΔOwnership_Benefit reflect the secondary, incidental 
benefits accruing to each party after the purchase.55 This may include the 
party’s new ability to sue the other for copyright infringement (e.g., the 
ability to apply C1 or C2). Generally, ΠA should be willing to pay as much 
as necessary to retain the benefit of A1 and to gain any incidental benefits 
that accompany copyright ownership (𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑨 ), as well as to 
avoid Disclosure_CostΠA (addition provides a straightforward way to assess 
the relation, but one will recognized that many real-world situations will 
involve more nuanced relationships). As previously discussed, the benefit of 
A1 to ΠA is already offset by the cost CostA1. Thus, the remainder is the 
maximum price ΠA would be willing to pay to own ΠB’s copyright (ΠA’s 
purchase price capacity). ΠA would be unreasonable to pay ΠB more than 
this amount. 
Δ’s analysis is similar. If Δ is committed to make the disclosure, then 
purchasing the copyright will permit Δ to (hopefully) close out A1 to avoid 
A1_LossΔ, to avoid Disclosure_CostΔ, and to receive any incidental benefits 
that accompany copyright ownership ΔOwnership_Benefit (such as suing ΠA). 
Unlike ΠA, Δ’s costs defending A1 are part of A1_LossΔ which contribute to 
Δ’s purchase price capacity, while ΠA’s costs pursuing A1 detract from ΠA’s 
purchase price capacity. Thus, all other things being equal, Δ may have a 
 
 54. While pseudo-algebraic one could infer actual dollar amounts from these considerations. 
 55. For example, where the open source license was offered under a dual commercial license, or 
where it permits the owner to influence its development. Naturally, such benefits may also include Δ or 
ΠA’s ability to “step in” ΠB’s shoes and bring a new cause of action against the other (e.g., C1 or C2). 
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slight bargaining advantage over ΠA (as illustrated in the arbitrary values of 
Figure 3). 
Δ also has a slight advantage in that it can make an offer to ΠB before 
ΠA. This will provide Δ with an opportunity to “prime” ΠB before ΠA can 
make its offer (additionally, Δ has the benefit of making its offer without ΠA 
having primed ΠB). Priming permits a party to establish a pricing reference 
point that influences subsequent negotiations.56 This priming advantage may 
manifest itself most acutely if it becomes clear that ΠB will not sell to Δ 
during their negotiations. Once this is clear, Δ will likely begin making 
outrageous offers to ΠB, with no real intention of fulfillment, expecting that 
ΠB will consider its preceding refusal of these offers when ΠA makes its own 
offer (e.g., causing ΠB to ignore an otherwise reasonable offer from ΠA). Δ’s 
first mover advantage also manifests itself in Δ’s ability to encourage ΠB to 
litigate before ΠA can make its offer. Particularly, if it again becomes clear 
that ΠB will not sell to Δ, then Δ may let ΠB know of the existence of a 
noncompliant licensee, without divulging that the licensee’s identity is ΠA. 
This knowledge may cause ΠB to prepare for litigation, particularly where 
such noncompliance has clearly resulted in a market loss to ΠB. If ΠB does 
not submit to Δ’s threat, Δ will immediately inform ΠB of ΠA’s breach, 
attempting to deprive ΠB of a negotiation opportunity before ΠA and ΠB enter 
a state of conflict. 
Despite these advantages, the prices ΠA and Δ are willing to pay for the 
copyright will probably be the determining factor in ΠB’s decision to sell. 
That some of the parameters influencing pricing are the same parameters in 
the threat credibility conditions can affect negotiations in interesting ways. 
For example, consider when Δ is making its threat to ΠA. Initially, Δ should 
emphasize to ΠA how great Disclosure_CostΠA is, and how small 
Disclosure_CostΔ is, so that ΠA is convinced that Conditions 1 and 2 are true. 
If it becomes apparent that the threat has been ineffective, though, such 
arguments may have instead simply convinced ΠA that it should be willing 
to pay a higher price than Δ for the copyright (see Figure 3). At this point, Δ 
may be unwise to simply backtrack and convince ΠA of the opposite view, 
as confessing that Disclosure_CostΔ is in fact quite large may simply raise 
𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑨 . Instead, Δ will likely retract its high assessment of 
 
 56. See, e.g., Paul Herr, Priming Price: Prior Knowledge and Context Effects, 16 J. OF CONSUMER 
RES. 67, 68 (Jun. 1989) (“Although priming can produce these judgmental and behavioral effects, what 
interests many is its often passive nature (see especially Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi, Nature of Priming 
Effects on Categorizations, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 59 (1985). Subjects do not necessarily 
consciously compare the stimulus to the primed category.”). 
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Disclosure_CostΠA while spurring ΠB to litigate before ΠA can make its own 
offer. 
To help conceptualize how parameter variations can influence the 
parties’ respective purchase prices, consider Figures 4 and 5. 
 
 
FIGURE 4: Example Variation “Little A1_LossΔ” 
 
Figure 4 illustrates a situation where Δ can make a purchase price offer 
competitive with ΠA’s offer, even when A1_LossΔ is “low”. Generally, such 
situations will be possible because, as mentioned previously, Δ’s ability to 
forego its A1 litigation costs contribute to its purchasing capacity (since 
owning the copyright will avoid these costs if A1 is settled) while ΠA’s A1 
litigation costs detract from its purchasing capacity (since those costs must 
still be incurred to gain the benefit of A1). 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Example Variation “Great A1_LossΔ” 
  
2016 OPEN SOURCE TACTICS 25 
 
Figure 5 considers a situation where ΠA brought A1 punitively (i.e., 
primarily designed to harm Δ rather than benefit ΠA). For example, large 
corporate conglomerates have sometimes found it effective to incur great 
short-term losses to outcompete a new, small market entrant.57 This may 
result in long-term benefits to the conglomerate by discouraging future 
entrants in other markets.58 Consequently, depending on how confident the 
conglomerate is in its long-term strategy, the goal may not be to incur a large 
BenefitA1, but simply to cause a large A1_LossΔ. A large A1_LossΔ, however, 
may compel the small entrant to pay a much larger price than ΠA for ΠB’s 
copyright as illustrated in the figure. As illustrated in Figure 5, ΠA may not 
be willing to pay a higher price even when Δ’s ownership of the copyright 
will compel ΠA to abandon A1.59 Additionally, by forcing the conglomerate 
to consider how much it would pay for the open source component, the 
smaller entrant may compel the conglomerate to evaluate the discounted 
present value of its deterrence program – an exercise the conglomerate may 
not otherwise have bothered to perform. 
b. Demonstrating Commitment - Failed Purchase 
What if Δ is unable, or unwilling, to purchase ΠB’s copyright and knows 
that both it and ΠA will be subject to devastating suits from ΠB (i.e., 
Condition 2 is unsatisfied)? Can Δ still make a convincing threat to ΠA even 
when the disclosure will ensure Δ’s own destruction or near-destruction? 
Often, yes. Game theory (and common sense) have long recognized that 
situations involving mutual destruction or near-destruction may be the basis 
for unilateral threats by demonstrating either: 1) a greater risk tolerance; or 
2) commitment. With regard to risk tolerance, Δ can give ΠA the impression 
that A1_LossΔ is much higher than it really is. Pursuant to Condition 2, this 
will compensate for an increased Disclosure_CostΔ making the threat 
credible again. Δ may also demonstrate a higher risk tolerance by including 
a counterclaim threat with the disclosure threat that will escalate A1 (e.g., 
initiating reciprocal patent infringement actions). This would likewise have 
the same effect as raising A_LossΔ. 
 
 57. Rightly or wrongly, large organizations are often compelled to adopt aggressive tactics against 
smaller retailers (See, e.g., Drew Sandholm, Amazon’s ‘Predatory Pricing’ Questioned, CNBC (Jun. 30, 
2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/30/amazons-predatory-pricing-questioned.html). Smaller retailers 
are then themselves compelled to respond with creative countermeasures such as the compliance-based 
tactics discussed herein. 
 58. The author understands that such strategies are not considered economic “dumping” as a matter 
of relative degree. 
 59. To clarify, in the example of Figure 5, CostA1 and Disclosure_CostΠA together are greater than 
BenefitA1. 
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With respect to commitment, Δ can inform ΠA tacitly, or directly, that 
it has denied itself the ability to back out of the threat (effectively reducing 
Ccontext for Condition 2). For example, consider where Δ begins the threat to 
ΠA with the following “dead switch” disclosure statement: “I have instructed 
a third party trustee to disclose everything I am about to tell you to ΠB unless 
the trustee hears of our settlement in a public news statement by the end of 
tomorrow. I have already paid the trustee and the trustee is now unreachable 
by any means other than that public news statement”.60 Assuming, ΠA 
believes that Δ is telling the truth (which may be demonstrated by a variety 
of means), Δ will have effectively eliminated Condition 2 from ΠA’s 
consideration. 
Effectively combining risk tolerance and commitment, Δ can also try to 
convince ΠB that Δ is irrational. As discussed in greater detail in the footnote, 
if Δ can credibly present the violation’s disclosure to ΠA as a “ticking time 
bomb”, the suppression of which is only partially within Δ’s control, then 
ΠA will be more likely to acquiesce.61 
2. Δ’s Ability to Notify ΠB 
Until now, the analysis has generally assumed that Δ has the ability to 
disclose ΠA’s breach to ΠB at Δ’s discretion. This may not be the case.62 
Consider the three factual variations: 
 
 60. Thomas Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 283 (Jun. 1956)(See 
discussion regarding “cross my heart” commitment). Thomas Schelling, supra, “An Essay On 
Bargaining” (“[I]f the buyer can accept an irrevocable commitment, in a way that is unambiguously 
visible to the seller, he can squeeze the range of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him,” 
emphasis added). Certainly, such a theatrical entrance would align with an extortion allegation, but as 
discussed previously, Δ may attempt to mitigate this risk by subsuming its behavior under the right of a 
third party beneficiary counterclaim (even if Δ’s threat to disclose to ΠB were construed as extortion, Δ 
could simply recharacterize the threat as the bringing of the counterclaim which would itself indirectly 
notify ΠB). This theatrical example could accordingly be re-characterized to this end, e.g.: “I have 
instructed my attorney trustee to file a counterclaim . . .” etc.  
 61. Michael Kinsley, A Nobel Laureate Who’s Got Game, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/ AR2005101101336.html.  
So you’re standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You’ll be released, and 
one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when 
the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? 
Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don’t have to convince him 
that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince 
him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, 
you win (emphasis added). 
 62. Note that this discussion concerns the ability to disclose, not the ability to threaten. “Extortion 
has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of 
themselves, may not be illegal.” Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299, 326, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606, 627, 139 
P.3d 2, 19-20 (2006) (emphasis added). ΠA may try to raise Disclosure_CostΔ by intimating or bringing 
(in jurisdictions where applicable) allegations of extortion after Δ has made its threat. E.g., In California, 
“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . induced by a wrongful use 
of force or fear . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE, § 518 (emphasis added). Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be 
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(a) Δ discovers ΠA’s noncompliance independently of any 
nondisclosure obligation (e.g., Δ discovers the noncompliance 
during A1 discovery when there is no protective order in place); or 
(b) Δ discovers ΠA’s noncompliance but is subject to a nondisclosure 
obligation (e.g., a prior contractual nondisclosure agreement with 
ΠA or a protective discovery order); or 
(c) ΠB becomes aware of ΠA’s noncompliance independent of any 
action by Δ (e.g., by luck or from a whistleblower within ΠA’s 
organization) 
Note that (a), (b), and (c) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For 
example, (a) may be true before litigation occurs, then (b) may be true once 
a protective order issues during litigation, and then (c) may occur 
independently of A1 (e.g., by coincidence). The following sections consider 
these situations in turn. 
a. Fact Pattern (a) – Δ Recognizes Breach Independently of Litigation or 
Any Restrictive Obligation 
For the breach to be “independent of the litigation or any restrictive 
obligation”, Δ should be at liberty to disclose the breach at any time of Δ’s 
choosing. This would mean that Δ is under no obligation, e.g., via a license 
from ΠA or by a protective order during discovery, which prevents such 
disclosure. License provisions preventing Δ from disclosing violations to ΠB 
are discussed in greater detail below. Δ’s circumstance will most often 
accord with this fact pattern (a), as ΠA’s software will often already be 
publicly accessible or at least subject to reverse engineering. 
 
induced by a threat, either: . . . 2. To accuse the individual threatened . . . of any crime; or, 3. To expose, 
or impute to him . . . any deformity, disgrace or crime” (CAL. PENAL CODE, § 519). While a compelled 
settlement of A1 might be construed as “the obtaining of property”, it’s less clear that the contemplated 
disclosure would be “wrongful”. As previously mentioned, if Δ can subsume its threat within its third 
party beneficiary rights, those rights may obviate claims of extortion. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pendergraft, 297 
F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Generally, a threat to file a lawsuit, even if made in bad faith, does 
not constitute extortion”) for a federal rather than state extortion discussion. 
Note that as extortion is only a criminal statute in many jurisdictions, civil remedies may not be 
available to ΠA, though a successful demonstration of extortion may suffice to nullify the resulting 
settlement agreement. Where civil remedies are not available ΠA may be able to introduce extortion as a 
predicate basis for alleging a RICO claim, See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 321 F. Supp. 2d 825, 
834 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
Some jurisdictions, such as California, do recognize a civil common law cause of action for 
extortion, but it’s unclear that the disclosure in question fits the pattern exemplified by this case law. For 
example, the common law version appears to require that the threat maker know that the crimes it will 
threaten to disclose are untrue. See, e.g., Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems 179 Cal. App. 3d 408, 
426 (1986) (The Court overruled on other grounds (“To be actionable the threat of prosecution must be 
made with the knowledge of the falsity of the claim”, citing Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 204 
(1959)); See also, Cohen v. Brown, 173 Cal. App. 4th 302 (2009).  
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Because this freedom affords the greatest bargaining power, litigious 
Δs or Δs fearing litigation may proactively seek to identify their competitor’s 
violations before entering into a license with ΠA and well in advance of 
anticipated litigation. The former will permit Δ to retain the benefit of 
knowledge of the violation (assuming its discovery is properly documented), 
while still binding itself to any forward-looking restriction. The latter will 
permit Δ to avoid any restrictions imposed during discovery, discussed 
below. 
b. Fact Pattern (b) – Δ Recognizes Breach During Litigation Discovery 
Δ’s ability to disclose a violation uncovered during discovery will 
depend upon the discovery context. While the public has an interest in 
reviewing court filings, courts often temper that interest (to varying degrees) 
based upon the parties’ interests.63 Anticipating this, an aggressive ΠA may 
try to isolate documents related to potential breaches by requesting a 
protective order in response to any of Δ’s discovery requests.64 This is hardly 
a fool-proof defense, however. Δ’s discovery request may itself enter the 
public record and encourage third party exploration of ΠA’s code.65 Where a 
 
 63. In California, the issuance and formulation of protective orders are to a large extent 
discretionary. See, e.g., Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 888, 904 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1985). ΠA’s task is somewhat further complicated by the fact that most federal circuits 
recognize a public interest in the sharing of information uncovered during discovery. 
“In Olympic Refining the Ninth Circuit established the principle which has remained the rule in this 
and virtually all other circuits ever since.” (Kraszewski, supra, 139 F.R.D. at p. 159.) This rule allows sharing of 
information in similar cases in order to ease the tasks of courts and litigants in the discovery process . . .” 
(emphasis added) (Fn. Omitted.) (Olympic Refining Company, supra, 332 F.2d at p. 265.) 
ΠA may seek to keep the violation confidential by preventing the appearance of software in the record. 
Particularly, “the majority of courts, both state and federal, do not recognize a public right of access to 
materials that parties exchange in discovery but do not file with the court.” Andrew D. Goldstein, 
Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information Gathered Through 
Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 376 (2006) (emphasis added). See also, Estate of Frankl v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 886-87 (N.J. 2004) (“The universal understanding in the 
legal community is that unfiled documents in discovery are not subject to public access.”) Such rules will, 
however, vary between jurisdictions; See also SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n. 11 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“[T]o the extent that Agent Orange relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) to find a 
statutory right of access to discovery materials, we observe that the recent amendment to this rule provides 
no presumption of filing all discovery materials, let alone public access to them.”); In contrast, see e.g., 
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The right of access 
to court documents belongs to the public, and the Plaintiffs were in no position to bargain that right 
away.”). 
 64. FRCP Rule 26 provides for protective orders (“(1) In General. A party or any person from whom 
discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or as an 
alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will be 
taken.”). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 65. Suspicion can be aroused in a number of ways – even a request by Δ for documents related to 
open source records that Δ knows will be denied may suffice to arouse the suspicion of a copyright owner 
such that they begin their own investigation. Indeed, because ΠA’s product is typically otherwise publicly 
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protective order issues, the court may be limited in the sanctions it can 
impose for its breach.66 Certainly, given how little Δ need say or suggest to 
ΠB for ΠB to infer the threat, the court may have difficulty establishing that 
Δ violated the order, let alone determining what sanctions would be 
proportional.67 Consequently, the sanctions may do little to increase 
Disclosure_CostΔ. Accordingly, a more proactive ΠA may instead prefer a 
contractual remedy as discussed in Section III, when Δ was a previous 
customer. 
c. Fact Pattern (c) – ΠB Recognizes Breach Independently of ΠA-Δ 
Litigation 
As timing is a critical factor in the effectiveness of Δ’s threat 
presentation, premature action by the copyright holder can severely mitigate 
the tactic’s effectiveness. Certainly, if ΠB asserts its rights before Δ has a 
chance to threaten ΠA with the disclosure, the tactic will be unusable. Still, 
it may be in Δ’s interests to acquire the copyright AFTER ΠB has discovered 
the breach. Certainly, this will likely be difficult, as ΠB will be able to then 
infer the value of the copyright to Δ and ΠA from the action.68 Still, ΠB’s 
price may change as each of the respective litigations progress and so the 
parties may revisit purchasing negotiations as their interests fluctuate. 
III. COUNTERING COMPLIANCE-BASED DEFENSE TACTICS 
This section provides general guidance for how ΠA may deny Δ use of 
the tactics discussed above. Certain countermeasures are already apparent 
 
accessible, it will be difficult for ΠA to demonstrate that Δ’s breach of a protective order was the “but-
for” cause for an independent investigation. 
 66. Adam M. Josephs, The Availability of Discovery Sanctions for Violations of Protective Orders, 
80 UNIV. CHICAGO L. REV. 1355, 1356-57 (2013) (“Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which allows for ‘further just orders’ when a party ‘fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.’ 
Courts, however, have disagreed over whether these sanctions can be applied to Rule 26(c) protective 
orders, though the vast majority of courts have held that they can. The discrepancy largely stems from 
the debate over whether protective orders issued during discovery are discovery orders for purposes of 
Rule 37 . . . The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly grant courts authority to issue sanctions in 
response to violations of ‘order[s] to provide or permit discovery.’ In addition to this explicit grant of 
authority, the inherent power of courts to sanction operates in the background, filling in gaps left by the 
Federal Rules under certain circumstances.”) 
 67. For example, context alone may suffice to inform ΠB of ΠA’s breach. Should Δ solicit a meeting 
with ΠB, making pointed reference to ΠB’s open source offerings while casually referencing the fact that 
ΠA has brought action against Δ, ΠB would probably infer the existence of ΠA’s breach even without Δ’s 
explicit notification. In such a scenario, it would likely be extremely difficult to demonstrate that Δ 
violated a protective order as no discovery information (save ΠB’s identity, which is unlikely to have been 
explicitly covered by the order) was used.  
 68. Once ΠB has begun litigation, it is more likely that ΠB will be able to play ΠA and Δ off one 
another to acquire the highest purchase price capacity of the two.  
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from the preceding discussion (e.g., anticipate Δ’s purchasing price, hide or 
at least make ambivalent the value of CostA1 and BenefitA1, etc.). 
Accordingly, this section instead briefly calls attention to proactive actions 
available to ΠA, which may not be simply counterpoints to the above 
discussion. 
A. Trade Secret-Contract Prevention 
Where, as in XimpleWare, Δ had a preexisting relationship with ΠA, ΠA 
may attempt to contractually deny Δ the ability to identify and act upon open 
source violations in ΠA’s products. One should note that such a provision 
may require considerable foresight, indeed, more than is presently typically 
applied in such contracts. Particularly, existing provisions regularly absolve 
ΠA of liability to Δ for such breaches, but do not limit Δ’s disclosure options 
concerning such liability.69 This section considers a contractual provision 
specifically identifying the breach of an open source license as ΠA’s trade 
secret, which Δ agrees to keep confidential.70 While possibly doing much to 
limit Δ’s options, such a provision may still be subject to various limitations 
as outlined below. 
1. Relevant Trade Secret Law 
The author is not aware of any specific legal doctrine, which would 
prevent ΠA from characterizing ΠA’s breach of an open source license as a 
trade secret. Indeed, such an act would appear to fall well within the “literal” 
definition of a trade secret in most jurisdictions. For example, in California 
a trade secret is defined as: 
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that: [¶] (1) Derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and [¶] 
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.” (§ 3426.1, subd. (d).)71 
Breach of an open source license is certainly “information” from which 
ΠA “derives independent economic value” since it is unknown to other 
 
 69. Indeed, the Author has often seen the former, but never the latter.  
 70. As will be discussed in greater detail below, there are many ways to characterize this contractual 
provision. For example, rather than characterize an open source breach as a “trade secret” the drafter may 
include a provision indicating that ΠA’s “service providers” and associated contractual relationships are 
trade secrets. The provision may deny Δ from contacting ΠA. Broadly drafted, the latter provision may 
have as restrictive an effect as the former.  
 71. UTSA: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426(1)(d). 
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persons (i.e., ΠB) who could sue for damages (“economic value”) from its 
“disclosure”. The contract provision itself would certainly demonstrate that 
the “trade secret” was subject to “efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy”. 
Not only state, but federal law, would appear to support such a trade 
secret interpretation. The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) similarly 
defines a trade secret as: 
(3) the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, 
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether 
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized 
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain 
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information72 
Again, the breach would likely qualify as “business . . . information” by this 
definition. 
Under the DTSA, it may be possible for Δ to disclose the 
noncompliance under a whistleblower exception, such as § 1833: 
§1833. Exceptions to prohibitions 
(a) In General.-This chapter does not prohibit or create a private right of 
action for  
(1) [. . .]; or 
(2) the disclosure of a trade secret in accordance with subsection (b). 
(b) Immunity From Liability for Confidential Disclosure of a Trade Secret 
to the Government or in a Court Filing. 
(1) Immunity.–An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly 
liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure 
of a trade secret that- 
(A) is made- 
(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government 
official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; 
and 
 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (emphasis added). 
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(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a 
suspected violation of law; or 
(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a 
lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under 
seal73 
Although the statute does not define “individual”, because the term 
“entity” is used separately it appears that “individual” refers only to human 
persons and not business entities. Despite this specificity, if the disclosure 
could be characterized as the action of an individual, rather than a breach of 
Δ as an entity, the provision may protect that individual from action by ΠA. 
This may simultaneously permit Δ the benefit of making good on its threat 
(assuming the individual does not appear as Δ’s agent). Particularly, there 
does not appear to be any reason to think that the disclosure may be made 
“to an attorney” under B(A)(i), would not include a disclosure to ΠB’s 
attorney. 
However, the “violation of law” referred to in B(A)(ii) is not clearly a 
“breach of contract”, but appears rather to refer to a breach of state or federal 
law.74 This doesn’t mean that B(A)(ii) won’t provide the basis for the 
individual’s disclosure, but it may be that Δ must find some other explicit 
federal or state law by which an individual may disclose to ΠB’s attorney. 
For example, “law” may be a state unfair competition statue, such as 
California Business and Professions Code 1720075, while the federal unfair 
competition provision 15 U.S.C. 45 may suffice at the federal level.76 While 
superficial and mostly speculative, this Section’s brief assessment of trade 
secret law should help the reader to appreciate at least the possibility of 
characterizing the breach, or a related act, as falling within trade secret 
protection.  
2. Doctrine of Unclean Hands and Exceptions 
Even if ΠA successfully categorizes the breach as a trade secret, 
however, equity may prevent ΠA from enforcing the contractual provision. 
In California, for example, the doctrine of unclean hands can limit the 
enforcement of a contractual provision at odds with equity. 
The defense of unclean hands arises from the maxim, “‘He who comes into 
Equity must come with clean hands.’ “ (Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990) 222 
Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059, 272 Cal.Rptr. 250 (Blain ).) The doctrine demands that 
 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 1833 (emphasis added). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(A)(ii). 
 75. California Business and Professions Code Section §§ 17200-17210 et seq. 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
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a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come 
into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, 
regardless of the merits of his claim. (Precision Co. v. Automotive Co. (1945) 
324 U.S. 806, 814–815, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381; Hall v. Wright (9th 
Cir.1957) 240 F.2d 787, 794–795.) The defense is available in legal as well as 
equitable actions. (Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of 
Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 728, 39 Cal.Rptr. 64 (Fibreboard ); 
Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 562, 574, 250 Cal.Rptr. 33.) Whether 
the doctrine of unclean hands applies is a question of fact. (CrossTalk 
Productions, Inc. v. Jacobson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 631, 639, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 
615.) The unclean hands doctrine protects judicial integrity and promotes justice. 
It protects judicial integrity because allowing a plaintiff with unclean hands to 
recover in an action creates doubts as to the justice provided by the judicial 
system. Thus, precluding recovery to the unclean plaintiff . . .77 
Because the breach of an open source contract is unlike the competitive 
advantage afforded by most trade secrets, in that it imposes on the legal rights 
of the open source licensor, a court may be more willing to apply unclean 
hands to the provision’s enforcement. The court will need to balance the 
public policy aspects of such a provision alongside the parties’ right to 
contract. Certainly, making confidential the harm caused by an FDA 
violation, or by illegal activity, would be unconscionable. But can failure to 
comply with an open source license be considered sufficiently egregious to 
obviate the parties’ right to contract? 
The answer to this question may depend upon the nature of the 
contractual provision’s language. For example, open source compliance is 
fraught with difficulties regarding upstream licensees, authentic 
representations of upstream license terms, and other complications. In one 
pathological scenario, an upstream licensor may deliberately, or 
accidentally, misrepresent their right to license a piece of software. For 
example, a disgruntled software programmer may release her employer’s 
proprietary code under the permissive MIT license. A downstream licensee 
may have no way of knowing of the upstream distributor’s 
misrepresentation. With regard to the abstraction of Figure 2, the diagram 
would be modified as follows: 
 
 
 77. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 973 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999), 
as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 3, 2000) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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FIGURE 6: Generalized Litigation Topology with Fraudulent 
Contributor/Distributor 
 
Here, a fraudulent distributor F is someone who purports to have the 
capacity to distribute code under an open source license, when in fact only 
the true owner ΠB has that right and has not authorized such a distribution. 
In this situation, ΠA is “as much a victim” as C and Δ, and indeed, the 
primary causes of action will be A2 and C4 against F. Where ΠA’s 
contractual provision with Δ anticipates this scenario, particularly where it 
only asks that ΠA be given a chance to remediate before Δ discloses, it seems 
unlikely that Δ will succeed in a defense of unclean hands.78 ΠA’s motive is 
no longer clearly directed to the suppression of a deliberate violation. Rather, 
the contractual provision now appears to merely be a precaution against 
upstream bad actors, albeit a precaution that imposes some confidentiality 
restrictions on Δ. A prescient Δ will demand that the contract language be 
narrowly tailored to a situation involving only an F and exclude other 
violations by ΠA, but such an “aggressive” stance would be unusual in most 
contractual negotiations.79 
 
 78. Such language directly anticipates, and to a certain extent, refutes the equitable basis for the 
defense of unclean hands. In this manner, ΠB would generally use language in the contractual provision 
directed to motives other than denying Δ access to ΠB, which have the incidental effect of denying Δ 
access to ΠB. 
 79. The temper of such a request would often disrupt otherwise “friendly” business negotiations. 
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B. Preemptive Due-Diligence 
It hardly needs stating that the simplest way for ΠA to nullify the above 
discussion is simply not to violate any open source agreements. Such a 
factual situation obviates the entirety of the above tactic. Unfortunately, 
compliance is often a nontrivial task, particularly where a product 
incorporates many different open source components. A proactive ΠA should 
impose ongoing compliance reviews and developer education to mitigate 
breach opportunities. Waiting until a product’s release to perform diligence 
may be imprudent, as this will require great time and cost to remediate any 
previously introduced violation. Similarly, waiting to perform diligence until 
preparing to bring A1 may be too late to effectively remediate (indeed, the 
engineers now aware of the failure may be deposed and inadvertently 
disclose the existence of a defect). Thus, an ounce of early prevention may 
well be worth many pounds of cure. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to illuminate aspects of the litigation tactics that 
may arise when a defendant discovers an open source violation on the part 
of the plaintiff. As a bargaining tool, such knowledge can be incredibly 
value, but only under the particular factual circumstances regarding the 
character of the license, the interests of the copyright owner, and the nature 
of the plaintiff’s business. Both parties have recourse to various defenses, 
but proactive due diligence is likely the most reliable method for nullifying 
the tactic’s applicability. 
